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Abstract
Market innovations following the ﬁnancial reforms of the early 1980s drastically
reduced equity requirements associated with collateralized household borrowing. This
paper examines the contribution of this development to the macroeconomic stabilization
that occurred shortly thereafter. The model combines collateralized household debt
with heterogeneity of time preference in a calibrated general equilibrium setup. We
use this framework to characterize the business cycle implications of lowering required
down payments and rates of amortization for durable goods purchases as in the early
1980s. The model predicts that this reduction of equity requirements can explain a
large fraction of the actual volatility decline in hours worked, output, household debt,
and household durable goods purchases.
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This paper examines the implications of the household credit market reforms in the early
1980s for macroeconomic volatility. Homes and other durable goods collateralize most house-
hold debt in the United States, and typical debt contracts require the borrower to take an
equity stake in the good that serves as collateral. A down payment imposes an initial equity
share on the durable good purchased, and the debt’s amortization dictates the pace at which
the equity share increases. The market innovations that followed the Monetary Control Act
of 1980 and the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982 greatly reduced these equity requirements, and
the well known decline in macroeconomic volatility occurred a short time after the reforms.
Because the stabilization was particularly dramatic for residential investment, Stock and
Watson (2002, 2003) suggest that these reforms substantially contributed to it. An exami-
nation of the behavior of household debt, reported below, supports such a link. Debt starts
to accelerate at about the same time that macroeconomic volatility drops, and its standard
deviation goes down more than most key aggregates’. This evidence motivates us to measure
the eﬀects of households’ equity requirements on macroeconomic volatility. For this purpose,
we use a tractable quantitative general equilibrium model of business cycles with household
debt.
In the model, debt contracts require the borrower to hold an equity stake in the good
that serves as collateral, as do most debt contracts in the United States. Equity requirements
could be generated by borrowers’ inability to commit to repayment combined with costly
repossession, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). However, the history of mortgage markets
strongly suggests that the large changes in equity requirements follow regulatory changes.
Accordingly, our analysis treats equity requirements as exogenous policy choices.
Household debt in the model reﬂects trade between two households with diﬀerent rates of
time preference, which we label the saver and the borrower. The saver represents the few very
wealthy households who own most assets in the United States, while the borrower represents
the other households who owe most debt. Both have inﬁnite lives and the only source of
uncertainty is an aggregate productivity shock, so the model incorporates the most salient
features of the U.S. household debt market without the complications of intergenerational
trade or idiosyncratic risk.
In equilibrium, the borrower owns nothing but the required equity stake in the durable
goods that collateralize household debt. When expanding purchases of home capital goods,
the borrower must increase labor supply to ﬁnance down payments. The higher labor supply
persists because of debt repayment. Fortin’s (1995) and Del Boca and Lusardi’s (2003)
1ﬁndings that the labor supply of married women increases with their households’ mortgage
debts supports such a connection between labor supply and household debt. Reducing the
equity requirement—by lowering the down-payment rate or extending the term of the loans—
weakens the link between durable purchases, debt, and hours worked; and thereby results in
lower aggregate variability.
Households’ equity requirements generate a transmission mechanism that can be con-
trasted with the ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect for investors in Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
or Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In those models, an exogenous increase in net worth of
borrowing-constrained investors is transmitted to higher investment. Iacoviello (2005) ex-
tended that framework to include a similar borrowing constraint for households. In his
model, a real estate appreciation raises output demand through its eﬀect on households’ net
worth. The mechanism in this paper works quite diﬀerently. Here, it is not the availabil-
ity of internal funds or collateral value that motivates further economic activity, but it is
their shortage: A shock that increases borrowers’ demand for durable goods creates a need
for funds to comply with the equity requirements. This in turn induces further economic
activity by expanding labor supply. This channel relies on the connection between debt
and durable goods purchases, so it does not arise in economies with a ﬁxed minimum for
household net worth, such as Krusell and Smith’s (1998).
Our analysis of the role of equity requirements in business ﬂuctuations starts with stan-
dard preferences and production possibilities. With this speciﬁcation, output volatility de-
pends primarily on the variance of productivity shocks—as in the basic Real Business Cycle
model—because inputs vary relatively little. Hence, lowering equity requirements reduces
output’s volatility modestly in spite of a substantial stabilization of hours worked. Following
King and Rebelo (2000), we then introduce preferences and production possibilities that re-
duce the size of the exogenous shocks consistent with a given volatility of output. This version
of the model predicts that lowering equity requirements substantially reduces macroeconomic
volatility.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the history of
household debt markets and the cyclical behavior of household debt. Section 3 presents the
model, and in Section 4 the model’s steady state is used to analyze long-run responses to a
ﬁnancial market reform. Section 5 builds intuition by analyzing the labor supply decision
in partial equilibrium. The quantitative results from calibrated versions of the model are
reported in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes.
22 Household Debt in the United States
This section provides context for our analysis by reviewing evidence on household debt in the
U.S. economy. It begins with a brief history of credit market institutions and policies and
concludes with an analysis of the household debt’s cyclical behavior since the Korean War.
Before proceeding, we document two basic aspects of household debt which remain un-
changed since the early 1960s. First, the vast majority of household debt is collateralized.
According to the Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers, homes and vehicles col-
lateralized 85 percent of total U.S. household debt in 1962. The analogous percentage from
the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances is 90 percent. Appendix A details the sources of these
observations. Accordingly, the remainder of this paper abstracts from unsecured debt.
Second, according to these two surveys, the middle class owes most collateralized house-
hold debt, and rich households hold most of the ﬁnancial assets. In 1962, households between
the tenth and ninetieth percentiles of the wealth distribution owed 79.5 percent of household
debt. In 2001, the corresponding ﬁgure is 72.7 percent. The funds for the ﬁnancial sector
that directly holds this debt come from wealthy households. Those with wealth above the
ninetieth percentile held 54.2 percent of ﬁnancial assets in 1962 and 72.8 percent in 2001.
Thus, most household debt reﬂects intertemporal exchange between middle class and wealthy
households rather than ﬁnancial trade among the wealthy or lending to the poor. The con-
centration of assets in a small fraction of households and the distribution of debt across a
large fraction of households will be key features of the model presented below.
2.1 A Brief History of Household Credit Markets
Prior to the Great Depression, typical mortgage payments were only interest, and homeown-
ers reﬁnanced their loans’ principles every few years. Semer et al. (1986) report that ﬁrst
mortgages had low loan-to-value ratios, but second and third mortgages with higher interest
rates were common. For other household durable goods, a multitude of ﬁnance companies
provided installment credit through retailers (Olney (1991)).
The Great Depression and its aftermath aﬀected these two segments of the household
lending market quite diﬀerently. Federal involvement in the mortgage market became mas-
sive, while other household credit was regulated much less. Deﬂation during the depression
period eroded housing values without aﬀecting nominal balances due at maturity, so many
borrowers were unable to ﬁnd lenders to reﬁnance their loans. The resulting defaults mo-
tivated the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations to exercise greater federal control over
3mortgage lending.
The Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932 and the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933
established a new environment for mortgage lending based on three regulatory principles.
First, regulation constrained savings and loans to raise most of their funds with short-term
deposits. Congress intended this to insulate the mortgage market from ﬂuctuations in other
ﬁnancial markets. Second, the federal government became savings and loans’ lender of last
resort. Finally, long-term amortized mortgages replaced the previous interest-only, periodi-
cally reﬁnanced mortgages. This reduced the possibility of systemic default risk at the cost
of raising borrowers’ required equity in their homes.
The maturity imbalance between Savings and Loans’ long-term assets and short-term
liabilities posed no challenge in a stable monetary environment, but the volatile ﬁnancial
markets of the late 1960s and 1970s pushed many savings and loans into insolvency. By
1980, the Volker monetary policy made the Savings and Loans’ regulatory environment un-
sustainable. The federal government abandoned the New Deal regulatory system with the
Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St.Germain Act of 1982. Florida (1986), and the
articles contained therein describe how this legislation eliminated restrictions on mortgage
lending and reintegrated it with other ﬁnancial markets.
Figure 1 illustrates the implications of credit market regulation since 1954. It plots the
ratio of mortgage debt to the value of owner-occupied housing, and the ratio of total household
debt to total tangible assets—owner-occupied housing and durable goods.1 The rapid increase
in the early part of the sample reﬂects the relaxation of residential credit controls near the
end of the Korean War. This trend partially reverses in 1966 with the extension of interest
rate ceilings on demand deposits (Regulation Q) to Savings and Loans. The ratio declined
through the ﬁnancial volatility of the late 1960s and 1970s. At the end of 1982 the debt-
asset ratios start a new dramatic increase. This surge reﬂects the emergence of the subprime
mortgage lending market and households’ greater use of home equity loans and mortgage
reﬁnancing to cash-out previously accumulated equity. Greater access to reﬁnancing and
home equity loans allowed homeowners to delay repayment of mortgage principle, and access
to additional subprime mortgages reduced eﬀective down payment requirements. After 1995,
the ratios of household debt to tangible assets stabilize at new and higher levels.
Although only the mortgage market underwent dramatic regulatory changes, the automo-
bile loan market also changed substantially. For the 1920s, Olney (1991) reports typical terms
1The source of these observations is the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts, Table B.100, Balance
Sheet of Households and Nonproﬁt Organizations.
4of car loans of 1/3 down and a repayment period of 12-18 months. During the 1972-1982
period, the average ﬁgures are 13 percent down and repayment period of 40 months, while in
the 1995-2003 period, the corresponding averages are 8 percent down and repayment period
of 54 months.2 Hence, equity requirements in this market eased considerably over time.
2.2 The Cyclical Behavior of Household Debt
The ﬁnancial developments at the end of 1982 preceded a fast increase in household debt
and a dramatic change in its cyclical behavior. Figure 2 shows the ﬂuctuations of total
household debt and its comovement with hours worked. Household debt is expressed in real
terms by dividing nominal values by the GDP price index, and hours worked is an index of
total private weekly hours. Both variables are logged and HP-ﬁltered. The ﬁgure shows two
phenomena. First, debt’s volatility declines dramatically in the early 1980s. Second, debt
and hours worked comove strongly until this time. Afterwards, their movements become
much less synchronized.
Tables 1 and 2 summarize these data using three sub-periods of the 1954:I–2005:III sam-
ple: (1) From the beginning of the sample through 1982:IV—the quarter of the Garn-St.
Germain Act’s passage—(2) from 1983:I onwards, and (3) from 1995:I onwards.
Table 1 reports the standard deviations of total household debt and mortgage debt along
with those of other key macroeconomic variables in these three periods. The standard devia-
tion of total debt declines from 2.8 percent in the period through 1982:IV, to 0.6 percent from
1995:I onwards. The corresponding ﬁgures for mortgage debt are 2.3 percent and 0.8 per-
cent. Table 1 also illustrates the decline in general macroeconomic volatility. The standard
deviations of hours worked, durable consumption expenditures, nondurable consumption ex-
penditures, and GDP all fall substantially after 1982; and they are even lower from 1995
onwards. As stressed by Stock and Watson (2002, 2003), the decline in investment volatility
reﬂects primarily residential investment: Its standard deviation falls from 12 percent to 2.6
percent, while the standard deviation of nonresidential investment remains essentially un-
changed. The ﬁnal column reports the ratios of the standard deviations in the last period
to those in the ﬁrst. By this measure, household debt, residential investment, and durable
goods purchases stabilize the most.
Table 2 quantiﬁes the comovement of hours worked and debt. Prior to 1983, the correla-
tion coeﬃcients of total and mortgage debt with hours worked are 0.86 and 0.82, respectively.
These correlations are substantially lower after 1982.
2The source of these observations is Federal Reserve Statistical Release G-19, Consumer Credit.
5The levels of per-capita household debt and hours worked also changed. Figure 3 plots
their logarithms. Both variables were constructed using the civilian noninstitutional popu-
lation 16 years and older. Debt starts to accelerate in 1983:I—consistently with the increase
in the ratio of household debt to tangible assets from Figure 1—and also hours worked per
capita begins then a persistent increase.
The evidence presented in this section indicates that the aggregate volatility decline since
the early 1980s was accompanied by a pronounced decline in the volatility of household debt.
Furthermore, household debt along with two closely-related variables, residential investment
and durable purchases, stabilize the most among the key variables considered. This paper
focuses on the possibility that the relaxation of equity requirements on households contributed
to the macroeconomic stabilization. For this analysis, we construct a quantitative general
equilibrium model with household debt.
3 The Borrower-Saver Model
In this model, household debt reﬂects intertemporal trade between an impatient borrower
and a patient saver. The saver owns all the productive capital and holds the borrowers’
debt. This reﬂects the fact that in the U.S. economy, few very wealthy households hold most
assets, and others owe most of the debt. Durable goods collateralize debt. We model the
credit market reform as an exogenous reduction of borrowers’ required equity in these durable
goods.
Without an equity requirement, the borrower’s debt to the saver would increase over time
to the maximum level the borrower can service using total labor income. Imposing an equity
requirement limits the debt, so the economy possesses a unique steady state with positive
consumption by both households. This requirement always limits the borrower’s debt if
the economy remains close to its steady state; so standard log-linearization techniques can
characterize its equilibrium for small disturbances. This is the solution approach we follow
below.
Next, we present the economy’s primitives, discuss the households’ optimization problems,
and deﬁne a competitive equilibrium.
3.1 Preferences
The preferences of savers and borrowers diﬀer in two respects: One is that savers are more
patient, and the other is that savers do not work. The ﬁrst assumption generates a concen-
6tration of assets in a relatively small number of households. This follows Krusell and Smith’s
(1998) use of heterogeneity in thrift to generate an empirically realistic wealth distribution.
Simplicity justiﬁes the assumption that savers do not work. Because there are few savers and
because they should each enjoy some of their wealth in the form of leisure, we expect them
to contribute little to aggregate labor supply. When we endow savers with the borrowers’
intratemporal preferences and calculate the steady state of the model calibrated as described
below, savers choose to not work at all unless they represent an inordinately large fraction of
the households. Accordingly, we simplify the model by abstracting from their labor supply.
In this case, no model statistics except consumption per saver and consumption per borrower
depend on the division of households into savers and borrowers.
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where ˆ β < ˜ β. In (1), ˆ St, ˆ Ct, and ˆ Nt are the borrower’s stock of durable goods—assumed
to be proportional to its service ﬂow—consumption of nondurable goods, and labor supply.
The speciﬁcation of the last term nests both a logarithmic form (γ = 1) and Hansen’s (1985)
linear form (γ = 0). In (2), ˜ St, and ˜ Ct are the saver’s consumption of the two goods.
3.2 Technology
The aggregate production function is Yt = Kα (AtNt)
1−α. Here, Yt is output, K is a constant
capital stock, Nt is labor input, At is an exogenous productivity index, and 0 ≤ α < 1.
The assumption that K is constant simpliﬁes the analysis in an aspect that is marginal in
the present context—which focuses on household capital goods. Furthermore, capital stock
movements are slow and thus not important for output volatility. We discuss the implications
of relaxing this assumption below in Section 6.5. The productivity shock follows the AR(1)
stochastic process lnAt = η lnAt−1 +εt, where εt is an i.i.d. disturbance with zero mean and
constant variance and 0 ≤ η < 1. We abstract from growth in this paper.
7Output can be costlessly transformed into nondurable consumption and durable goods
purchases. That is, Yt = Ct + Xt. Here, Ct represents aggregate nondurable consumption
and Xt = St+1 − (1 − δ)St is aggregate investment in the durable good, which depreciates
at the rate δ.
3.3 Trade
All trade takes place in competitive markets. The two households sell capital services and
labor to a representative ﬁrm and make loans to each other. We denote the rental rate of
capital and the wage rate, in units of consumption, with Ht and Wt. Assuming that unbacked
state-contingent claims are unenforceable, the only security traded is collateralized debt with
a period-by-period adjustable interest rate. The amounts ˆ Bt+1 and ˜ Bt+1 are the outstanding
debts of the two households at the end of period t, and the corresponding gross interest rate
is denoted Rt.
Exogenous equity requirements on the goods that serve as collateral constrain intertem-
poral trade between borrowers and savers. The equity requirements mimic a typical feature
of loan contracts in the United States: An equity share that potentially increases as the good
ages. This requirement is closely related to a down payment and a rate of debt amortiza-
tion. The down payment reﬂects the initial equity share, and the rate of debt amortization
determines its subsequent path. The parameters capturing these features are 0 ≤ π < 1,
the initial equity share, and φ, which governs the speed of subsequent equity accumulation.
When a loan is collateralized by a durable good j periods old, the required equity share at
the time of the next debt payment is





(1 − π). (3)
For newly purchased goods (j = 0), the equity share is just π. As the good ages (j increases),
the equity share increases towards one when φ > δ, and stays constant when φ = δ. The
history of U.S. debt markets reviewed above indicates that the change in households’ equity
shares in the early 1980s reﬂected a decision to deregulate. Here, we model this deregulation
by lowering π and φ.
For a household with positive debt, the total amount of equity at the beginning of period
t + 1 is (1 − δ)St+1 − RtBt+1, where the durable stock is adjusted for depreciation and the
debt for accumulated interest. This household’s required equity in its durable goods stock
8sums the equity requirements on the (depreciated) goods of all ages from (3):





If the constraint in (4) always binds for a household, then it has the following recursive
representation for the debt:
Bt+1 =






In (5), the expression (1 − δ)(1 − π)/Rt is the loan-to-value ratio for new purchases, and
(1 − φ)Rt−1/Rt is one minus the rate of amortization of the outstanding debt. In this for-
mulation, the equity constraint is expressed as a ﬂexible borrowing constraint, depending on
current durable purchases and the outstanding debt.
In this environment, the two households choose asset holdings, consumption of the two
goods, and (for the borrower) labor supply to maximize utility subject to the budget and the
borrowing constraints. Firms choose their outputs and inputs to maximize their proﬁts.
3.4 Utility Maximization
The condition that the market in collateralized debt must clear implies that the equity
constraint binds for one type of household at most. We conjecture that near the steady state it
binds for the borrower. After characterizing the steady state, verifying this is straightforward.
We now turn to the analysis of the households’ utility maximization problems, given this
conjecture.
3.4.1 Utility Maximization by the Borrower
We consider ﬁrst the borrower’s problem, given the assumption that the equity constraint in
(4) always binds. In this case, its debt is constrained to evolve as
ˆ Bt+1 =






The binding equity constraint also implies that the borrower never purchases productive
capital, so the corresponding budget constraint is
ˆ Ct + ˆ Xt = Wt ˆ Nt + ˆ Bt+1 − Rt−1 ˆ Bt. (7)
9Given R−1 ˆ B0 and ˆ S0, the borrower chooses state-contingent sequences of ˆ Ct, ˆ Xt, ˆ Nt, and
ˆ Bt+1 to maximize the utility function in (1), subject to the sequences of constraints in (6)
and (7).
Denote the current-value Lagrange multiplier on (7) with Ψt. If we express the Lagrange
multiplier on (6) as ΞtΨt, then Ξt measures the value in units of either consumption good of
marginally relaxing the equity constraint.
In addition to the two constraints and the transversality conditions, limt→∞ ˆ βtE [Ψt] =













































Equation (8) looks familiar, but the equity constraint changes its interpretation. For an
unconstrained household, such as the saver, it deﬁnes the value of relaxing the intertemporal
budget constraint. The borrower cannot freely substitute intertemporally, so Ψt represents
only the marginal value of additional current resources.
A standard condition for optimal investment in durable goods equates the purchase price
of a durable good to its immediate payoﬀ (the marginal rate of substitution between durable
and nondurable goods) plus its discounted expected resale value. Equation (9) has the same
interpretation if we deﬁne 1 − Ξt (1 − π)(1 − δ)/Rt to be the eﬀective purchase price of
the durable good for the borrower. This is the actual price less the beneﬁt from relaxing
the borrowing constraint by purchasing an additional unit—which allows borrowing at the
maximum loan-to-value ratio.
Equation (10) is the consumption-leisure condition. It has the usual form because it
involves only intratemporal substitution, which is not aﬀected by the ﬁnancial market im-
perfections.
Setting Ξt and Ξt+1 to zero reduces (11) to the standard Euler equation. When the equity
constraint always binds, Ξt in (11) can be interpreted as the price of an asset which allows
10the holder to expand its debt by (1 − φ)j(Rt/Rt+j), j ≥ 0, in period t + j. It equals the
payoﬀ to additional current borrowing—the violation of the standard Euler equation—plus
the asset’s appropriately discounted expected resale value.
3.4.2 Utility Maximization by the Saver
The maximization problem of the saver is standard, but we describe its solution here for
the sake of completeness. We impose the ownership of the entire capital stock on the saver,
since the borrower never owns capital if (5) always binds. Given the constant stock, ˜ K, and
the initial durable goods and savings in the borrower’s household debt, ˜ S0 and −R−1 ˜ B0, the
saver chooses state-contingent sequences of ˜ Ct, ˜ Xt, and ˜ Bt+1 to maximize utility subject to
˜ Ct + ˜ Xt − ˜ Bt+1 = Ht ˜ K − Rt−1 ˜ Bt. (12)
The right-hand side of (12) sums the sources of funds: Capital rental revenue and the value
of previous savings. The left-hand side includes the three uses of these funds: Nondurable
consumption, purchases of durable goods, and current saving.
We denote the current-value Lagrange multiplier on (12) with Υt. The ﬁrst-order condi-
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and the budget constraint (12). Equation (14) is a typical condition for optimal purchases
of durable goods, and (15) is the standard Euler equation.
3.5 Production and Equilibrium
The representative ﬁrm takes the input prices as given. Letting Nt denote labor input used
by the ﬁrm, proﬁt maximization implies that
















11With the economic agents’ maximization problems speciﬁed, we deﬁne a competitive equi-
librium. Given the two households’ initial stocks of durable goods, ˆ S0 and ˜ S0, the stock of
outstanding debt issued by the borrower and held by the saver, B0 = ˆ B0 = − ˜ B0, the prede-
termined initial interest rate on this debt, R−1, and the initial value of the technology shock,
a competitive equilibrium is a set of state-contingent sequences for all prices and the bor-
rower’s, saver’s, and representative ﬁrm’s choices such that both households maximize utility
subject to the constraints, the representative ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt, the two households’
durable goods stocks evolve according to ˆ St+1 = (1 − δ) ˆ St + ˆ Xt and ˜ St+1 = (1 − δ) ˜ St + ˜ Xt,
and input, product, and debt markets clear.
4 The Deterministic Steady State
We next characterize the economy’s steady state. In light of the substantial increases in the
ratio of debt to durable goods and in hours worked after 1982, we focus here on the level
eﬀects of changing the equity requirement parameters π and φ.
In the steady state, the saver’s Euler equation immediately determines the interest rate,
R = 1/˜ β. With R in hand, we calculate the borrower’s choices. Equation (11) implies that
Ξ =
1 − ˆ β/˜ β
1 − ˆ β (1 − φ)
> 0. (18)
Hence, the equity constraint on the borrower binds at the steady state, as conjectured in
Section 3.4.
To solve for the steady state we proceed as follows. From (9), the borrower’s ratio of
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To express these two ratios as functions of the primitive parameters we use (18) in (19), and
then the resulting expression as well as the debt accumulation constraint (5) into (20).
12With the solution for the ratio of consumption to labor income in hand, the optimal
labor supply condition (10) determines ˆ N. As ˆ C/(W ˆ N) declines, labor supply increases.
Obtaining W, H, and the rest of the borrower’s steady-state choices is then straightforward.
The steady-state capital rental rate, the outstanding household debt, and the steady-state
versions of (12) and (14) then determine the saver’s choices of ˜ C and ˜ S.
The steady state can be used to examine the long-run implications of changes in equity
requirements. Lowering π has no impact on Ξ, but it directly increases ˆ S/ ˆ C and B/ˆ S. Hence,
ˆ C/ ˆ NW decreases from (20), and N goes up according to (10). Intuitively, reducing the down-
payment rate lowers the eﬀective cost of durable goods to the borrower and thereby induces
a shift from leisure to durable goods. Also, the ratio of household debt to the aggregate
stock of durable goods, B/

ˆ S + ˜ S

, the model’s counterpart to the ratios plotted in Figure
1, increases as the down-payment rate declines.3
Lowering the rate of debt amortization, φ, has the same qualitative implications as reduc-
ing π. In this case, the decline in the eﬀective cost of durable goods reﬂects an increase in Ξ.
Thus, the changes in the model’s steady state following a reduction in equity requirements—
lower down-payment and amortization rates—are qualitatively consistent with the long-run
changes in hours worked and debt observed in the U.S. economy after 1982. In Section 6.6,
we evaluate these eﬀects quantitatively.
5 The Labor Supply Decision
To develop intuition for interpreting the next section’s quantitative results, we characterize
here the borrower’s response to wage changes in partial equilibrium. We compare the bor-
rower’s labor supply across two regimes: Zero and positive equity requirements. To sharpen
this comparison, we also contrast the borrower’s labor supply behavior to a permanent-
income consumer’s. This analysis demonstrates that labor supply responds only when there
is a positive equity requirement.
Assuming that Rt = R and φ = δ simpliﬁes this discussion. If the borrower starts oﬀ
with no assets and no durable goods ( ˆ B0 = ˆ S0 = 0), then ˆ Bt = ˆ St (1 − π)(1 − δ)/R for all
3The ratio ˜ S/B declines along with ˆ S/B. The eﬀect on ˜ S/B can be shown using the budget constraints
of the two households and HK = α
(1−α)NW.




(1 − π)(1 − δ)
R

ˆ St+1 = Wt ˆ Nt + π(1 − δ)ˆ St, (21)
where the uses of funds appear as nondurable consumption and down payments on the desired
stock of durable goods, and the sources of funds are labor income and accumulated equity.
The ﬁrst-order conditions can be now combined to yield
ˆ β
θ ˆ Ct
(1 − θ)ˆ St+1
= u +
π (1 − δ)
R






where u ≡ (R − 1 + δ)/R is the conventionally deﬁned user cost of the durable good. In
(22), the marginal rate of substitution between ˆ St+1 and ˆ Ct equals the user cost—as it would
be for a permanent-income consumer—plus an additional positive term related to the equity
requirement. Note here that the term in square brackets is the deviation from the standard
Euler equation, which is positive when the equity constraint binds. We consider next the
labor supply response to a wage change in two equity requirement regimes.
5.1 Zero Equity Requirements
This case corresponds to π = 0. Given the assumption that φ = δ, the equity requirement
remains constant at the initial level (zero in this case) for any purchased durable good. The
borrower’s eﬀective price of durable goods, deﬁned above as 1−(1−π)(1−δ)/R, becomes now
the conventional user cost. This is also the relevant price in the ﬁrst-order condition (22).
Here, an immediate and full adjustment of ˆ Ct and ˆ St+1 to the wage change, while leaving ˆ Nt
constant, simultaneously satisﬁes both equations and the condition for ˆ Nt in (10). Therefore,
a zero equity requirement eliminates completely the eﬀects of wage ﬂuctuations on labor
supply. This result also holds for the more general utility function
z1−σ
t
1−σ v(1 − Nt), where z is
a CES aggregator of the two consumption goods and σ > 0, v0 > 0, v00 < 0. The same feature
of these preferences that King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) rely upon for balanced growth—
exactly oﬀsetting income and substitution eﬀects of permanent wage changes—drives the
invariance of labor supply to a wage change when π = 0.
Here, however, the insensitivity of ˆ Nt to wage changes holds regardless of their persistence.
In other words, the income and the substitution eﬀect of any wage change exactly cancel
each other. The borrower in this case behaves as a “rule-of-thumb” consumer, who spends all
14current labor income (on nondurable consumption and on the user cost of the durable stock).
Hence, the borrower’s reaction under zero equity requirements diﬀers substantially from the
permanent-income consumer’s, for which the persistence of any change is critical for the
strength of the income eﬀect. This diﬀerence between the borrower and a permanent-income
consumer arises from the borrower’s limited access to the ﬁnancial market. The permanent-
income consumer is unconstrained in the ﬁnancial market, while for the borrower, the zero
equity requirement limits debt. The constraint still binds because, as an impatient household,
the borrower would like to borrow beyond the total value of its durable goods.
5.2 Positive Equity Requirements
When π > 0, the presence of the required accumulated equity in the budget constraint (21)
makes the proportional adjustment to a wage change infeasible. Hence, the adjustment of
ˆ Ct and ˆ St+1 must be less than proportional to the wage. The optimal labor supply condition
(10) and the decline of ˆ Ct/Wt then imply that ˆ Nt rises above its long-run level. This occurs
for both permanent and transitory wage changes.
From the borrower’s partial equilibrium responses it follows that labor supply ﬂuctuations
in the model arise from the required accumulation of equity on durable goods. We now
proceed to evaluate this source of business cycle propagation quantitatively.
6 Quantitative Results
To assess the quantitative implications of this framework for macroeconomic volatility, we
solve the model and simulate the impact of the empirically relevant changes in household loan
markets. We consider ﬁrst a regime of high equity requirements, for which the parameters
π and φ are matched to loan observations through 1982:IV. The eﬀects of the ﬁnancial
market reforms in the early 1980s are then assessed by considering a regime of low equity
requirements, which is matched to loan observations from the period from 1995:I onwards.
As shown in Figure 1, the latter period corresponds to a stabilization of the ratio of household
debt to tangible assets after the reforms. We interpret this as convergence of credit markets
to the new environment.
156.1 Calibration
Except for π and φ, all the parameters are held constant across the two regimes. We consider
two alternative values for γ, the parameter governing the elasticity of labor supply. In the
baseline case considered ﬁrst, γ = 1—i.e., leisure enters utility in logarithmic form. In Section
6.4, we consider also the case of γ = 0, where leisure enters utility linearly.
The production function elasticity α equals 0.3. The parameters of the exogenous produc-
tivity shock process are set as follows. Using the value η = 0.95 from Hansen and Prescott
(2001), σε is calibrated so that the model’s standard deviation of output matches its actual
counterpart in the 1954:I–1982:IV sample. The resulting value is 0.0078. The same values
of η and σε are then used in the simulation of the second regime. The depreciation rate δ
is 0.01, the appropriately weighted average of 0.003 for owner occupied residences and 0.031
for cars.4
We chose ˜ β so that the quarterly interest rate is one percent. Because the borrower’s
discount rate does not inﬂuence the interest rate, actual market rates are not useful for its
calibration. We set ˆ β = 1/1.015, i.e., half of a percentage point higher than the interest rate.
This degree of impatience is similar in magnitude to that used by Krusell and Smith (1998).
Using a model with 3 levels of time preference, Krusell and Smith calibrate the diﬀerences
between each type as 0.36%; or 0.72% between the two extremes. We have experimented
with various values for this parameter with almost identical results to those reported below.
To calibrate π and φ, we utilize observations of automobile loans and mortgages. An aver-
age loan-to-value ratio is matched to the model’s steady-state counterpart (1 − δ)(1 − π)/R.
Given the values of R and δ, this equality is used to solve for the initial equity share π. The
steady-state amortization rate φ is equated to an average repayment rate. The inputs into
the calibration of the high- and low-equity requirement regimes are observations from the
Federal Reserve Board of loan terms from before 1983 and from 1995 onwards. Appendix B
describes the calibration of π and φ in detail. The resulting values are 0.16 and 0.0315 for
the high equity requirement regime and 0.11 and 0.0161 under low equity requirements. The
latter value of φ embodies an assumption that the current wide availability of home equity
loans and low-cost mortgage reﬁnancing allows homeowners to delay repayment of mortgage
principle and so avoid accumulation of equity on their homes.
4The source is “Fixed Assets and Consumer Durable Goods in the United States, 1925-97.” The service
life of 1-4 units residences is 80 years. Automobiles’ service life of 8 years is inferred from the reported
non-linear depreciation proﬁle. We used the weights 0.75 and 0.25, which are the shares of the owner occupied
residential stock and consumer durable goods stock in the 1954-2004 sample.
16The remaining parameters are θ and ω. We chose these simultaneously to match an
average share of hours worked of 0.3 and the average share of durable goods expenditure
in total households’ expenditures in the 1954:I-1982:IV sample of 0.21. To calculate this
ratio, we adjusted the NIPA’s nondurable personal consumption expenditures by subtracting
the imputed service ﬂow of housing. We then added residential investment to personal
consumption expenditures on durable goods. Given the other parameters, including the
π and φ values for the high equity-requirement regime, the unique values of θ and ω that
replicate these observations are 0.37 and 1.395. Table 3 summarizes the calibrated parameter
values.
6.2 Household Borrowing and Aggregate Dynamics
We begin the quantitative analysis with a description of the two households’ simulated deci-
sions in general equilibrium with the model calibrated to the high equity-requirement regime.
Figure 4 plots impulse responses of key variables to a positive productivity shock of 1/(1 − α)
percent. All the variables are expressed as percent deviations from their steady-state values.
The price responses are not shown since they are similar to those in the standard RBC model:
The productivity shock directly shifts up labor demand, so the wage rises and thereafter falls
slowly to its steady-state level. The interest rate response has a similar shape, given the
increased demand for consumption by both households, but it is very small given their high
interest sensitivity.
The individual households’ responses illustrate the intertemporal exchange between them.
Although the productivity shock increases the rental income from capital, the saver’s durable
purchases and nondurable consumption reﬂect the higher interest rate: Durable consumption
declines and nondurable consumption trends upwards. Hence, the saver’s reaction is to
purchase the borrower’s debt; helping to ﬁnance a surge in the borrower’s consumption. As
in the partial equilibrium discussion in Section 5, the increase in hours worked by the borrower
reﬂects the equity requirements: Labor supply must increase to satisfy these requirements
on newly purchased durable goods.
An important characteristic of this model is that temporarily higher income induces the
borrower to increase debt—in contrast to the response of a permanent-income consumer,
who would save in order to smooth consumption. This arises because borrowing cannot be a
vehicle for consumption smoothing for equity constrained households. For them, purchases
of durable goods must accompany borrowing.
176.3 Equity Requirements and Aggregate Volatility
We turn now to the paper’s main issue: How important is the relaxation of equity require-
ments for aggregate dynamics? Figure 5 compares the impulse responses of aggregate vari-
ables under the two regimes, high and low equity requirements, to the same 1/(1 − α) percent
increase in At.
In the low equity-requirement regime, the responses of hours worked and the debt have
about half the magnitude of the responses in the high-requirement regime. The response
of hours worked reﬂects the mechanism discussed in Section 5: Moving closer to a zero
equity requirement reduces the labor supply reaction to wage movements. The change in the
response of the debt follows mainly from the lower repayment rate. If φ > δ, a young durable
good has a lower equity requirement than an old one with the same after-depreciation value
to the owner. When a positive shock reduces temporarily the average age of the borrower’s
durable goods stock, its average equity requirement declines accordingly. Given that the
borrower fully exploits borrowing opportunities, the ratio of debt to durable goods overshoots
its long-run level. This overshooting is eliminated when φ = δ, because then age is irrelevant
for the required equity share on a durable good. Lowering the equity constraint makes φ
much closer to δ and greatly reduces debt overshooting.
Figure 5 also shows that the large proportional decline in the response of hours worked
produces only a small decline in the response of output. Given the standard utility and
production functions, the exogenous productivity shock dominates output dynamics. In the
next subsection, we follow King and Rebelo (2000) and introduce preferences and production
possibilities that enhance the contribution of labor ﬂuctuations to output.
6.4 A High-Substitution Economy
Here we set γ = 0 in the borrowers’ utility function, leading to Hansen’s (1985) utility
speciﬁcation. For savers, the utility function remains the same because there is no labor
supply decision.
The production structure is changed to increase the elasticity of output with respect to
labor, keeping the income shares of borrowers and savers calibrated at realistic values—which















is a composite of intermediate inputs. A proﬁt maximizing
18monopoly extracts each input from the ground at a constant marginal cost in units of ﬁnal
output, and savers own all of these monopolies’ shares.
We set α = 0 and solve for the representative ﬁnal good ﬁrm’s optimal level of Mt. Then,
we can express its value added as a linear function of labor input, Yt = κAtNt, where κ is
a constant.5 The elasticity of output with respect to labor is now unity. However, labor’s
share in income is less than one because the savers receive monopoly proﬁts. These proﬁts
are the diﬀerence between total payments to the monopolies and their production costs. It
can be shown that savers’ share of income is ν = (1 − ρ)/(1/ϑ − ρ).
Given that in this economy the non-labor income share is ν, we now calibrate this param-
eter, and not α, as 0.3. Also σε is calibrated again. As with the baseline economy, we chose
its value so the standard deviation of output in the high equity-requirement regime equals
the standard deviation of output in the 1954:I-1982:IV period. Given the high-substitution
nature of this economy, this parameter is reduced from 0.0078 in the baseline economy to
0.0039. Finally, the requirement that N = 0.3 implies that ω = 2.77.
Figure 6 shows the impulse responses for the two regimes in this economy. The diﬀer-
ence in output response between the high and low equity-requirement regimes is much more
pronounced than for the baseline economy, particularly on impact.
Table 4 presents the standard deviations of HP-ﬁltered data from both economies. The
standard deviations for the baseline economy reﬂect the impulse response functions in Figure
5: The decline in volatility is concentrated in debt and hours.
The results are substantially diﬀerent for the high-substitution economy, on which we
focus henceforth. The last column of Table 4 shows that, except for nondurable consumption,
volatility is substantially less in the low equity-requirement regime. For output, the ratio of
the standard deviation in the low-requirement regime to its high-requirement counterpart is
0.68. The actual ratio from periods 1995:I-2005:III and 1954:I-1982:IV in Table 1 is 0.53.
Hence, the present mechanism can reproduce a large part of the decline in output volatility.
Similarly for the debt: The model’s volatility ratio is 0.39, while the actual counterparts are
0.21 for the total debt and 0.35 for mortgage debt. The model reproduces the actual ﬁnding
that the decline in the volatility of the debt is the most pronounced.
The model also accounts for much of the dramatic stabilization of durable purchases.
The ratio of standard deviations from the low- and high-requirement regimes is 0.60. The
actual ratios for residential investment and durable consumption purchases are 0.22 and
5The same reduced form can be obtained when the production function is Yt = (Xt)
α (AtNt)
1−α , Xt
is capital services determined by Xt = min{HtK,Mt}, and Ht is the rate of capital utilization. In this
speciﬁcation, intermediate inputs, such as energy sources, are a requirement for capital utilization.
190.36. The volatility decline in hours worked is larger in the model than in the data. The
model’s ratio is 0.54, and in the data it is 0.65. Nondurable consumption stabilizes in the
model only modestly: The volatility ratio is 0.93 while the actual ratio is 0.57. However,
the model captures the fact that durable purchases and residential investment stabilize more
than nondurable consumption, although to an exaggerated extent.
The model qualitatively reproduces the decline in the correlation of hours worked with
debt. The correlation goes down from 0.60 to 0.53 compared to actual decline from 0.86 to
0.11 for total debt, and from 0.82 to 0.33 for mortgage debt (Table 2). The larger decline in
the data could reﬂect uncorrelated measurement errors attached to hours worked and the real
debt, given that a reduction in the “true” volatility would augment the relative importance
of such errors and thereby reduce the estimated correlation.
6.5 Endogenous Capital Stock
We explore here the implications of allowing the capital stock to vary endogenously. A
variable capital stock gives the saver an additional avenue for intertemporal substitution.
Given the non-labor income share α(1 − ν) + ν = 0.3, we assume that α = 0.10 and hence
ν = 2/9. We also set the depreciation rate for physical capital to 0.025 per quarter. The
impulse responses from this economy display a well-known problem with models with multiple
capital stocks. Immediately following a shock there is a dramatic increase in productive
investment along with a similarly strong decline in savers’ purchases of durable goods. In
the following period the pattern is reversed. This instability reﬂects the lack of adjustment
costs for either one of the stocks. Productive investment is built ﬁrst all-at-once, and then
the durable goods stock is increased. Introducing adjustment costs for at least one of the
stocks would alleviate this counterfactual behavior. Our assumption above that the capital
stock is constant represents an extreme form of adjustment costs.
The experiment of lowering the equity requirements in this economy yields similar results
as those obtained previously with the high-substitution economy. The ratio of the standard
deviation in the low equity-requirement regime to its high-requirement counterpart is 0.73,
which is somewhat higher than the 0.68 ratio in the previous results. Hours worked also
stabilizes somewhat less in this model. The ratio of its standard deviations is 0.52 instead of
0.54. There are two diﬀerences between this economy and that considered earlier, short-run
curvature in the production function and endogenous capital accumulation. The diﬀerences
between their results arise from the curvature of the production function. If we choose the
same values of α and ν in the high-substitution economy with a ﬁxed capital stock, then
20the ratios of standard deviations for output and hours worked are 0.78 and 0.60. When
the production function has curvature, stabilizing hours worked makes the equilibrium wage
more volatile. This partially oﬀsets the original stabilization.
The economy with a variable capital stock and the original economy with a constant
capital stock represent two extreme speciﬁcations for adjustment costs, none and inﬁnite.
Nevertheless, output substantially stabilizes in both economies when equity requirements
drop. This leads us to presume that parameterizations of adjustment costs for physical
capital that lie between these two extremes will also produce such an endogenous decline
in output variance. Extending the model to include business investment with more realistic
adjustment costs is therefore of interest, but it lies beyond the scope of this paper.
6.6 Comparison of Level Changes
Figures 1 and 3 indicate that the increase in the ratio of the debt to the durable stock following
the reforms in the early 1980s coincides approximately with a trend change in hours worked
per capita. The steady-state analysis predicts that both hours worked and the ratio of debt to
the durable stock should increase following a relaxation of equity requirements. Here, using
the parameter values and the model’s steady state, we evaluate these changes quantitatively,
and compare them to those from 1954:I-1982:IV to 1995:I-2005:III.
The percentage increase in average hours per-capita across these two sample periods is 5.8
percent. In the baseline economy, the steady-state increase from the high to the low equity-
requirement regime is 5.0 percent, and in the high-substitution economy it is 7.2 percent.
Hence, the model predicts the order of magnitude of the change in hours worked. Regarding
the ratio of total debt to the durable stock, the average ratio for the period 1954:I-1982:IV
is 0.34, and for 1995:I-2005:III it is 0.45. The analogous ratios using mortgage debt are 0.32
and 0.42. The corresponding ratios in the high and low equity-requirements regimes (in both
model economies) are 0.17 and 0.33. The increase in the ratio of household debt to assets is
a fairly direct consequence of the relaxation of the equity constraint. It is more surprising,
however, that this ﬁnancial change can also reproduce the observed increase in hours worked.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies the implications of equity requirements on households for macroeconomic
stability. The mechanism works through labor supply—lowering equity requirements weakens
the connection between constrained households’ durable purchases and their hours worked.
21The striking change in the behavior of household debt and hours worked after the ﬁ-
nancial deregulation of the early 1980s coincided with the macroeconomic volatility decline.
We believe that this evidence warrants a focus on the link between household borrowing
and labor supply. The quantitative results indicate that weakening this link substantially
contributed to macroeconomic stability. Of course, other factors could contribute to the
stabilization. McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Blanchard and Simon (2001), Kahn et al.
(2002), Stock and Watson (2002, 2003), and Campbell and Fisher (2004) discuss other ex-
planations. One related to ours holds that ﬁnancial liberalization may aﬀect macroeconomic
volatility by increasing households’ ability to smooth consumption. However, as Blanchard
and Simon (2001) point out, this channel is not a promising route for explaining the greater
macroeconomic stability. The volatility of nondurable consumption and services should de-
cline, but the volatility of durable purchases should counterfactually increase—due to easier
adjustment towards optimal stocks.
The contribution of lower equity requirements to macroeconomic stability arises in the
present model where debt has stable value. That is, there are no inﬂation shocks which
substantially change homeowners equity. This is important to note because low equity re-
quirements also characterized the 1920s, and these arguably contributed to the following
Great Depression. In fact, as we discussed above in Section 2, the architects of the New Deal
regulatory system sought to stabilize the housing market by imposing equity requirements.
The key diﬀerence between the 1920s and the time since the 1990s is the monetary stability
of the latter period. This makes the present model a much better representation of recent
macroeconomic history than of the 1920s and 1930s.
The analysis in this paper abstracts from the implications of the ﬁnancial reform for wel-
fare. A comparison of steady states reveals nothing in this respect, because the intertemporal
substitution that beneﬁts the borrower occurs along the transition path. In a companion pa-
per (Campbell and Hercowitz, 2006), we calculate the transition path for this calibrated
economy. The model’s transition starts oﬀ with previously constrained households cash-
ing out some of the home equity in excess of the new lower requirement. This borrowing
surge increases the interest rate. Over time, the debt stabilizes at a higher level while the
interest rate returns gradually to it’s steady state. The welfare analysis of the calibrated
economy indicates that both households gain in terms of discounted utility at the time of
the reform, although the saver’s gain is much larger than the borrower’s because the terms
of intertemporal trade move in her favor.
We conclude by noting that the interaction of borrowers and savers in the presence of
equity constraints might have interesting implications for the analysis of monetary and ﬁscal
22transmission mechanisms. Lowering the interest rate in a model with standard intertemporal
substitution contracts labor supply by reducing the price of current leisure relative to future
leisure. In a monetary version of the present model, we expect a lower interest rate to expand
labor supply by increasing the demand for durable goods. This mechanism is relevant also for
ﬁscal policies involving temporary redistribution of resources. A temporary transfer of funds
from borrowers to savers should lower the interest rate—as the latter attempt to smooth
consumption—and hence it should be expansionary. For example, a tax cut for all agents
ﬁnanced by government borrowing—which can be from savers only—should be contractionary
in the present setup because it generates a transfer in the opposite direction.
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A Measurement of Collateralized Household Debt
This appendix provides the details behind the claim in Section 2 that homes and other
durable goods collateralize most household debt in the United States. From the 1962 Survey
of Financial Characteristics of Consumers, Projector and Weiss (1966), Table 14, report that
homes and real estate secured 77 percent of household debt, and automobiles another 8
percent. Using data from the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances, Aizcorbe, Kennickell, and
Moore. (2003) report that borrowing collateralized by residential property accounted for 81.5
percent of households’ debt in 2001 (Table 10), and installment loans, which include both
collateralized vehicle loans and unbacked education and other loans, amount to an additional
12.3 percent. Credit card balances and other forms of debt account for the remainder. The
reported uses of borrowed funds (Table 12) indicate that vehicle debt represents 7.8 percent
of total household debt, and, hence, collateralized debt (by homes and vehicles) represents
almost 90 percent of total household debt in 2001.
B Calibration of π and φ
This appendix presents the details underlying the calibrated values of π and φ for the two
equity-requirement regimes.
Our observations of automobile loan terms come from Federal Reserve Statistical release
G.19, which reports the average loan-to-value ratios and repayment periods for automobile
loans from 1971 onwards. Over the 1971-1982 sample, the average loan-to-value ratio is 0.87,
and the average term of a new car loan is 13.4 quarters. During the 1995:I-2004:II sample, the
average loan-to-value ratio for cars is 0.92, and the average term of car loans is 18 quarters.
For mortgage loans, the calibration is based on the Survey of Consumer Finances. The
SCF includes the year of home purchase, the equity stake in the home, and the original
maturity of the ﬁrst two mortgages. Our basic measure of the initial equity share is the
average equity share of homeowners who purchased their homes within twelve months of the
interview date (for the 1983 SCF) or in the interview year (for the 1995 and 2001 SCF’s)
and who borrowed at least half of the home’s value. In the 1983 SCF, there are 104 such
homeowners. Their average equity share is 0.2275 with a standard error of 0.0137. In the
1995 and 2001 SCF’s, there are 334 and 251 comparable homeowners. Their average equity
24shares are 0.1756 and 0.1749 with standard errors 0.0090 and 0.0094. For the same sample
in the 1983 SCF, average mortgage term and its standard error are 85.5 and 3.8 quarters.
For the 1995 and 2001 samples, the estimates are 102 and 108 quarters, with standard errors
of 2.1 and 2.0 quarters.
The fact that the initial equity shares and maturity observations from 1995 and 2001 are
very similar supports the assumption that by 1995 the reform of household credit markets
was largely complete. We use the average of the two years’ observations as our measures of
mortgage down-payment rates and terms for the period beginning in 1995.
Because the survey period for the 1983 SCF immediately followed the enactment of the
Garn-St. Germain Act, we think of these terms as representative of mortgage terms at the
end of the period of substantial ﬁnancial regulation. To check whether they are typical also
prior to the ﬁnancial reform, we examined the trends in average mortgage terms before 1983,
as reported in the Federal Home Loan Bank Board’s Monthly Interest Rate Survey. This
survey includes only single-family homes, and hence it is more restrictive than the SCF. From
1963, the ﬁrst available observation, to 1982, this survey reports stable loan-to-value ratios.
The average loan-to-value ratio from 1963 to 1982 is 0.73 and this changed little over these
twenty years. This average implies an equity share approximately four percentage points
higher than we measure with the 1983 SCF. However, when we broaden the SCF sample
to include all borrowers (i.e., also those who borrowed less than half the home’s value), we
obtain an almost identical initial loan-to-value ratio of 0.72 with a standard error of 0.02.
Hence, the average initial equity share from the 1983 SCF of 0.2275 seems a good estimate
for the period before the reform.
In contrast to the stability of the loan-to-value ratio, the average repayment period in-
creased from 85.2 quarters in 1963 to 102.4 in 1982. This increase indicates that the average
mortgage term in 1983 is higher than the typical term for the period of interest. Hence, we
adjust downwards the 85.5 quarters measure from the 1983 SCF by subtracting half of that
increase. The resulting loan term is 76.9 quarters.
We assemble these observations into calibrated values of π and φ for the two regimes.
For the ﬁrst regime, we measure the repayment rates of mortgage and automobile debt with
the inverse of their average terms to maturity. Then, we calculate φ as the weighted average
of these repayment rates, where the weights are the average shares of mortgage debt and
consumer credit in total household debt over the period. From 1954 through 1982, these
shares are 0.7 and 0.3, so the calibrated value of φ for the high equity-requirement regime
is 0.0315. The ﬁnancial reforms in the early 1980s substantially widened the options for
reﬁnancing and the availability of home equity loans. Given these developments, a household
25can practically extend the repayment period to the entire life of the home. Accordingly, we
assume that the repayment rate of home loans equals the rate of physical depreciation, 0.003.
Reﬁnancing and second loans have never been prominent features of automobile ﬁnance, so
the terms of new car loans continue to reﬂect actual equity constraints. As before, we
measure the repayment rate of automobile loans with the inverse of their average maturity.
Averaging these with the shares of mortgage and consumer credit during the period 1995:I
through 2005:III (3/4 and 1/4) yields a value of φ of 0.0161 for the low equity-requirement
regime.
Similarly, π is a weighted average of the initial equity shares from automobile and mort-
gage debt. Ideally, the weights would reﬂect the ﬂow of loans used to purchase new cars
and homes. Such observations are not available, so we construct the weights indirectly. In a
steady-state version of the model with two durable goods, loans extended in each category
should equal the principle repayment rate multiplied by the category’s steady-state debt.
Given the repayment rates and debt shares used to calibrate φ for the period before 1983:I,
the implied shares of home and automobile loans in total loans extended are 0.29 and 0.71.
The resulting value of π for the high equity-requirement regime is 0.16 (the weighted average
of 0.2275 for homes and 0.13 for cars). The average initial equity shares for both automobiles
and homes fall by 0.05 from the ﬁrst to the second sample period. Hence, we set the value
of π for the low equity-requirement regime equal to 0.11.
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28Table 1: Percent Standard Deviations of HP-ﬁltered U.S. Data(i)
Sample Period
1954:I-1982:IV 1983:I-2005:III 1995:I-2005:III Ratio(ii)
Total Debt(iii) 2.77 1.88 0.59 0.21
Mortgage Debt(iii) 2.32 1.76 0.81 0.35
Hours Worked 1.97 1.52 1.29 0.65
Residential Investment 11.99 5.20 2.59 0.22
Nonresidential Investment 5.12 4.79 5.00 0.98
Durable Goods(iv) 5.66 3.07 2.03 0.36
Nondurable Goods & Services(iv,v) 1.14 0.64 0.65 0.57
Output 1.88 1.11 0.99 0.53
Notes: (i) All variables are logged and HP-ﬁltered over the period 1954:I-2005:III. (ii) Ratio
of standard deviation for the period 1995:I-2005:III to that for the period 1954:I-1982:IV.
(iii) Nominal debt divided by the chain-weighted GDP deﬂator. (iv) Personal consumption
expenditures on the given category. (v) We chain subtracted housing services from personal
consumption expenditures on nondurable goods and services.
Table 2: Correlation Coeﬃcients of HP-ﬁltered Hours and Debt(i)
Sample Period
1954:I-1982:IV 1983:I-2005:III 1995:I-2005:III
Total Debt & Hours Worked 0.86 0.45 0.11
Mortgage Debt & Hours Worked 0.82 0.32 0.33
Note: (i) All variables are logged and HP-ﬁltered over the period 1954:I-2005:III.
29Table 3: Calibrated Parameter Values











Table 4: The Model Economy’s Standard Deviations(i)
Baseline Economy High-Substitution Economy
High
(ii) Low(ii) Ratio High
(ii) Low(ii) Ratio
Debt 2.16 1.03 0.48 1.87 0.72 0.39
Hours Worked 0.66 0.41 0.63 1.34 0.72 0.54
Nondurable Consumption 0.74 0.80 1.08 0.52 0.48 0.93
Durable Purchases 6.25 5.02 0.80 7.36 4.41 0.60
Output 1.88 1.70 0.90 1.88 1.28 0.68
Notes: (i) The entries are population standard deviations of logged and HP-ﬁltered observa-
tions. (ii) Equity requirement regime.










Household Debt / Tangible Household Assets
Mortgage Debt / Owner Occupied Real Estate
Figure 1: Ratios of Households’ Debts to their Tangible Assets
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Figure 2: HP Filtered Real Household Debt and Hours Worked(i)
Note: (i) Debts and Assets measured at current market values.




Real Household Debt per Capita






Hours Worked per Capita
Figure 3: Real Household Debt and Hours Worked
Notes: The panels plot the logarithms of per capita hours worked and nominal household
debt divided by the deﬂator for GDP. The average value of hours worked and the value in
1983 of real debt are normalized to zero. See the text for further details.
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Figure 4: Household Responses with High Collateral Requirements to a Technology Shock
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Figure 5: Aggregate Responses to a Technology Shock




Hours Worked                    




Debt                            
           
0.00
0.72
Nondurable Consumption          
















Figure 6: Aggregate Responses to a Technology Shock in the High-Substitution Economy
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